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                         I INTRODUCTION 
   Let us begin by citing a common example. We always think that 
we should abide by law. This idea appears to be part of common sence 
in our daily life. Why then is it so? That it is because law is given 
by the ruler is a pre-modern explanation which no longer obtains. We 
may now answer the question by reasoning as follows : In modern states 
political power is exercised in acordance with law. In other words, it 
is legally exercised. Here lies the foundation on which a system of 
legality is established to guarantee the security of citizens. Shouldn't we 
then do the same and obey law on our part ? Through this reasoning 
law abiding or legality has become an axiom in modern states or in 
the minds of us moderns. 
   Recently, however, the validity of this idea of legality as part of 
common sense has been challenged or exposed to criticism. Fascism, 
for instance, does not now pass in its true color, but assumes the name 
of law into which, however, political designs are incorporated. In the 
form of such `legal fascism' various oppressive measures have found 
their way into the code, to the infringement of civil rights and liberties. 
Law abiding or legality is no bulwark against contemporary legal 
1) This summary forms a part of the author's important theme ` The Natural Law 
Doctrine and Legal Positivism'.
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fascism. Hence the necessity of devising such a thing as the right 
of resistance. So goes the argument. Thus we see the poles of legal 
thought in legality on the one hand and the right of resistance on the 
other. 
   Legality and the right of resistance are among the most fundament-
al problems with which jurisprudence is confronted, both because the 
one has been part of common sense and because the other is calling 
the common sense in question. Instead of tackling the whole problems 
squarely, however, the writer must content himself with offering an 
introduction to it within these pages. We will first examine the genesis 
of the idea of legality and of the right of resistance and the reasons 
why they are at issue. We will then proceed to consider some attempts 
at solving the problemes with relerence to a doctrine or two by drawing 
only on German literature. We will not go beyond trying to give a 
clue to an understanding of the fundamental problems by discussing 
them as problems of the history of thought involving the natural law 
doctrine and legal positivism. 
                           II GENESIS 
   It is common knowledge that the doctrine of the right of resistance 
or the right of revolution is of ancient origin. But it was in the 
Declaration of Human Rights made at the time of the French Revolution 
that the right of resistance was definitely declared in the specifically 
modern sense of l'resistance a l'oppression. It is also worthy of notice 
that the doctrine was not necessarily opposed to the principle of legality 
at first. The revolutionary bourgeois in those days claimed, on the one 
hand, civil rights and liberties against the arbitrary rule of their feudal 
government and the right of resistance against its oppression as natural 
and inviolable rights. Thus the right of resistance was asserted as one 
of the civil rights and liberties on the basis of, or in connection with, 
the natural law doctrine. But, on the other hand, the revolutionary 
bourgeois also insisted on the principle of legality. For the point of the 
principle was that all political power be exercised on the sole basis of law, 
by which term law, however, they meant legislation enacted in the 
Assembly dominated by themselves.
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   Taken altogether, therefore, there is no doubt but that the principle 
of legality and the right of resistance doctrine have their common roots 
in the claims of the bourgeois, and that to that extent both the theories 
are not diametrically opposed to, but closely related with, each other. 
We may point out the fact, for example, that in the history of thought 
the theory of the separation of powers was growing side by side with 
the doctrine of natural rights or fuudamental rights. 
   But it goes without saying that both the principle of legality and 
the right of resistance doctrine are basically conditioned by the process 
of growth of civil society and the state in the respective countries. It 
is only too natural, therefore, that the tempo and structure of such 
growth should give a peculiar color to the relations between the two 
doctrines. In Germany under consideration, for instance, we see indicat-
ions of the rise of the principle of legality and the fall of the right of 
resistance doctrine earlier in legal theory and legal opinions than in 
legal institutions. Thus the sharp distinction made between law and 
morals (Legalitat and Moralitdt) by Thomasius-Kant may be cited as 
indicative of the trend. Towards the middle of the 19th century, the 
principle of legality was established, while the doctrine of the right of 
resistance along with its legal provisions was almost wiped out of 
existence. We say almost, for we see it lingering in Marx, Engels, 
0. Gierke and others.') With these few exceptions, the right of resist-
ance disappeared. Why? Let us discuss in the following pages the 
factor responsible for the dissolution of the right of resistance doctrine 
and that instrumental in the establishment of the principle of legality. 
             III THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF 
                  LEALITY AND LEGAL POSITIVISM 
   As the first factor (of the dissolution of the right of resistance 
doctrine) scholars often point to the formation of a consiitutional state. 
In a constitutional state, say Wolzendorff, Heyland and others,') the right 
2) Neue Rheinische Zeitung, 19, 25, 27, 28, Februar, 1849. R *3R, ~i ,7 • i 
  , M4,S 408.-Jo 
   Otto von Gierke, Recht and Sittlichkeit, in : Logos, Bd. VI. 1916/7. 237-9. 
a1 Kurt Wolzendorff, Staatsrecht and Naturrecht, 1916, 461ff. „ Im modernen Staat ist
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of resistance has no reason or need for being, because the right of 
resistance was devised as one of the civil rights and liberties or so as 
to safeguare them, and that was exactly what a constitutional state was 
for. A constitutional state has civil rights and liberties to secure on 
the one hand and has machinery set up for that purpose in the shape 
of a system of separated powers on the other hand. Here, so goes the 
argument, the right of resistance has no longer any raison d'etre or 
anything to exist for either as an institution or as a doctrine. 
   A constitutional state is synonymous with a government of law 
(Rechtsstaat) and, therefore, it was founded on the principle of legality. 
It may be said with some exaggeration that the right of resistance as 
a doctrine or as an institution is dissolved in a constitutional state, or 
is swallowed up by the rising principle of legality. 
   Now let us inquire into the second factor (in establishing the 
priciple of. legality). Legality presupposes the existence of law in 
definite form. We cannot make such law, interpret it and make a 
system of legality without theory or legal thinking. Especially rational 
legal thinking is required for definite law. This factor, therefore, is 
related to the process of rationalization of law and legal thinking. 
Now we will go into the question how this process went on in Germany : 
    1. The Process of Rationalization of Law. It was not until the 
March Revolution of 1848 that modern bourgeois society was formed. 
Growing capitalism helped build up a firm foundation for such society. 
But capitalism in the modern sense, as M. Weber says, had some 
demands as to law and its administration. It demanded rational justice 
and rational administration to fit its rationality." It was really in 
this period extending from the latter half of the 19th century to the 
beginning of the 20 century that legislation including codification grew 
aber these Herrschermacht in das Recht gestellt....... der Staat ist Rechtsstaat. Daher 
wurde fur den modernen Staat die Anerkennung eines Volkswiderstandsrechtes den 
rechtlichen Verzicht auf die Wahrung seiner Herrschermacht bedeuten, also eine Selbs-
tentausserung seines Wesens " (461-2). Carl Heyland, Das Widerstandsrecht des Volkes, 
1860, 76-8. 
4) On this thema see the excellent studies by Max Weber, Rechtssoziologie, in : Wirts-
chft and Gesellschaft, 487ff, or Wirtschaftgeschichte, 1924, 240, 292, or Gesammelte 
Aufsatze zur Religionssoziologie, Bd. I. S. 11.
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until finally it dissolved and replaced a heterogeneous hierarchy of laws 
-consisting , for instance, of popular law, lawyers' law, custormary law, 
statute law (Volksrecht, Juristenrecht, Gewohnheitsrecht, Gesetz). Thus 
law was increased in quantity and at the same time was rationalized 
in form. 
   2. Legal Positivism. Attention must also be paid to the role legal 
thinking played in the meantime. Most typical of it is legal positivism, 
which may be described as a position with a definite subject matter and 
method. It confines its subject matter to positive law susceptible of 
empirical recognition and grasps it in an empirical and positivistic way. 
In its relation to the process of rationalization of law, it was not 
sociological positivism but conceptual or logical positivism that matters. 
Such legal positivism was founded in private law by Windscheid, the 
master of pandect jurisprudence, in public law by Laband and in legal 
philosophy by Bergbohm.5' It is characterized by extremely condensed 
logical thinking. With some variations this theory has as its media 
well-defined concepts, logic and interpretation to rerson that a legal 
system is perfect without holes or inconsistencies. On the one hand, 
therefore, such legal thinking may be said to have played no unimportant 
part in making law rational in form, and that in making modern bourgeois 
law fit to meet the needs of capitalism, while, on the other, it established 
the principle of legality and a system of legality in a constitutional state 
through interpretation and application. 
   Since the latter half of the 19th century the principle of legality 
seems to have thus overcome the right of resistance till it finally 
absorbed the other into itself. But the very process of establishment of 
principle of legality was one in which many questions concerning the 
legality were brought to light and, moreover, the right of resistance 
asserted itself for reconsideration. To disclose the points of such quest-
ions let us trace the process of establishment of the principle. 
   3. Legality. The principle of legality has it that political power is, 
5) Bernhard Windscheid, Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechs, Bd.I. 8 Aufl., bearbeitet von T. 
Kipp, 1900, 90ff, 93. Paul Laband, Das Staatsrecht des Deutschen Reiches, 5 neubea-
beitete Aufl., Bd. I. 1911, Vorwort zur 2 Aufl., IX-X. Karl Bergbohm, Jurisprudenz and 
Rechtsphilosophie, 1922, 81ff, 381ff.
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and should be, exercised on the basis of law or, in other words, legally 
exercised. Besides, in a modern constitutional state a logically closed 
system of legality is formed, or, to use a common phrase, the idea is 
formed of the rule of norms, not of men or power. Thus a judge 
should always obey law alone and maintain a neutral position. Here a 
judge bound by legal rules appears in the light of a legal slot-machine.') 
In this often caricatured judge we see on important consequence of legal 
positivism and a concrete aspect of the legality principle. A similar 
picture may be expected of people at large. In this case laws should 
of course be respected, since it is the very kernel of legality. Hence 
comes the idea that we should obey all laws or legislation, whatever 
it may be. This is the idea of which we spoke above as part of common 
sense. In short, the legality principle is established on the basis of 
the observance of laws, for power as a principle of restraining it and 
for people at large as a principle of their behavior. 
    On the other hand, however, we mustpay attention to an important 
assumption underlying such reliance on legality or state legislation. It 
is the assumption that legality guarantees legitimacy" or that laws 
(Gesetze) are an exhaustive embodiment of justice or law (Recht). 
   The logical consequence of this assumption is that a judge has not 
to look beyond laws, nor has a legal positivist to worry about justice or 
injustice in handling concrete problems, and that the general public can 
obey laws with a good conscience. 
    There is some roomfor doubt, however, as to whether this assumption 
was really carried to the said consequence. Let us first take up the 
idea that justice or law (Recht) is exhaustively embodied in laws. State 
laws are made by the legislature, but as a matter of form it is free 
from social and moral responsibility. It is possible then that a legislature 
dominated by an extremely one-sided political will or social interest may 
enact socially or morally bad, unjust laws, such as social legislation 
(Sozialistengesetz) enacted under sham constitutionalism (Scheinkonsti-
6) Cf. Gustav Boehmer, Grundlagen der burgerlichen Rechtsordnung, II. 1 Abt., 1951, 
126. Max Weber, Rechtssoziologie, 491ff. 
7) Franz Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit, 1952, 272. - -
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tutionalismus) in the age of Bismarck. The last mentioned is an early 
specimen of bad laws ; it purported to control the freedoms of speech, 
assembly, the press and others with reference to a specified class of 
persons and made breaches punishable in accordance with special penal 
provisions. Indeed this is none the less a law and to abide by it is 
legal. But the result to be expected from its observance would be to 
make an exception to, and place a restriction on, the guarantee of civil 
rights and liberties which is the proper mission of a constitutional state 
and the proper object of the legality principle. Some say that the law 
was meant to restrain socialists. Much the same remark applies as well 
to Nazi legislation, to cite another example. The arbitrary rule (Wil-
lkiirherrschaft) by the Nazi was no doubt immoral. But their rule was 
realized in the name of, and in the shape of, laws. From the point of 
view of form, it was a body of laws and their rule was legal. Hence 
the name legal fascism. 
   It is questionable in these cases, especially in that of the Nazi, 
whether the assumption is really valid'that legality guarantees legitimacy. 
An extreme legal positivist (Gesetzespositivist) may still say that a law 
is a law and must be obeyed in these cases, too, and that all that is 
needed is legality. Then the Nazi rule will be given free scope in the 
form of legal fascism and civil rights and liberties ignored. If, therefore, 
the legality principle or laws are consisdered from the standpoint of 
form alone, it follows of logical necessity that unjust rule or unjust laws 
will be justified as legal or just. Here is a question. This is why 
criticisms are leveled at legal positivism or why the legality principle 
or law abding is questioned and shaken. Such criticisms are basically 
directed to the following point : We should give consideration to the 
substantial side of the legality principle or of laws rather than to the 
formal side, and we may present a protest againt unjust rule or unjust 
laws. But criticisms will naturally vary with basic standpoints. Let us 
introduce below a few criticisms with wide variation. 
     IV CRITICISMS ON LEGALITY AND THE NATURAL AW DOCTRINE 
   1. The Free Law Doctrine. We may start with the free law 
doctrine (Freirechtslehre). It attacks the dogma of logically closed and
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consistent law (die Geschlossenheit and Widerspruchslogigkeit des 
Rechts), the basic assumption of legal positivism. It assumes that there 
are a variety of forms of law besides legal rules and it insists on free 
law finding and free law making by judges. The doctrine expands our 
legal horizon beyond the narrow range of state legislation, to be sure, 
but, on the other hand, as is often pointed out, the theory was found 
fit to meet the needs of the bourgeois ie entering upon the imperialistic 
stage, with the noteworthy result that it rendered the legality principle 
practically meaningless. It is no wonder, then, that it should indeed have 
paved the way for the apparently legal Nazi fascism. Was this. free 
law doctrine the only legal thought that lent a helping hand , to the 
growing Nazi fascism? Where are we to find the standard of criticism 
applicable to Nazi fascism? The post-war natural law doctrine shows 
an interesting trend. 
   2. The Post-war Natural Law Dcotrine. In founding his natural 
law doctrine, the late Professor Radbruch, the distinguished legal philo-
sopher, said that, on the one hand, the Nazi used as their tool extreme 
legal positivism that assumes the unquestionableness of given laws,'' 
while, on the other, they accepted the position of the free law doctrine 
when they turned laws into dead letters by the use of general clauses.'' 
This is how they established their rule. But their laws, even if it is 
written in the code, are nothing but legal injustices (gesetzliches 
Unrecht). It should, therefore, the great jurist goes on to say, be 
subjected to criticism from the point of superlegal aw (iibergesetzliches 
Recht). 
   Going, Mitteis, Welzel and others join with him in leading the 
post-war natural law movement in Germany. On the basis of natural 
law they try to answer two questions. One is the question of 
criticism by judges on laws that are against natural law. The other is 
the question of the right of resistance. According to Professor Going, 
judges may, in limited cases of course, positively criticize anti-natural 
8) Gustav Radbruch, Gesetzliches Unrecht and iibergesetzliches Recht, 1946 (in : Rechts-
philosophie, 4 Aufl., 1950, 347ff.). Geist des englischen Rechts, 1947, 65ff. 
9) Radbruch, Vorschule der Rechsphilosophie, 1948, 78ff.
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law laws and refuse to obey them.' This is his answer to the 'first 
question. He goes on to the second. When the government is intention-
ally acting against natural law, positive resistance is allowable and just. 
But the tremendous modern technical power being in the hands' of the 
Government, positive resistance will be in any case a matter of life or 
death. Now a duty imposed by natural law is primarily ethical. There 
is no positive law duty to resist, but a mere appeal for spontaneous 
struggle."' 
   Here 'in these two answers we see the ultimate 'standard in natural 
law or, more concretely, in substantial justice or ethics, or in any case 
in extrajuristic or metajuristic norms. 
   Now we must perhaps admit that ethical and other norms may find 
their way into laws. We must also avoid the legal positivist's way of 
looking on law as complete without holes or inconsistencies. In no way, 
however, do we mean by so saying that natural law should hold. It 
goes without saying that laws sbould meet the demands of objective 
justice. But this propositition does not lead to the validity of natural 
law. Furthetmore, natural law is based on metajuristic recognition, and, 
to make the matter worse, it has too many meanings and is understood 
from many points of view. Isn't it questionable to employ such natural 
law as the substantial standard to be applied to laws ? It may be useful 
as a critical standard for Nazi fascism, but we must admit that it 
involves the risk of weakening legality like the general clauses of free 
law advocates. For judges' criticism passed on laws in the name of 
natural law has the same implications as free law finding and free law 
making. 
   Legal Positivism Reexamined. Now let us go back to legal posi-
tivism, where we started. There the principle of legality is stressed; 
the " principle in itself should no doubt be highly appreciated as 
such. Only problems rose under extreme legal positivism in which 
absolute reliance on laws or state laws was not accompained with 
reflection and criticism on its assumptions. Are laws just ? Does legality 
10) Helmut Coing
, Grundzuge der Rechtsphilosophie, 1950, 168f.
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guarantee legitimacy ? The absence of such reexamination will:, often 
lead to an absurd conclusion that it is legal to observe law$ Which are 
bad in substance. This has given rise to complicated problems of legality. 
             V LEGALITY AND THE RIGHT OF RESISTANCE 
    After all this consideration we have come to the last question. How 
can we, with due respect for legality, defend civil rights and liberties 
against bad law and oppression-the proper object of the legality, prin-
ciple ? Or, we may put it this way, how to solve the dilemma,, of 
formalism ? Let us take up an interestiug theory that has a. little 
different approach. 
    This doctrine attaches much importance to legality, condtending that 
the principle of legality has a positive meaning in capitalist society. , So 
far it shares the idea of legal positivism. But it distinguishes it elf 
sharply from legal positivism in that it views legality and laws in 
sociological and historical light 
    Now laws as the standard of legality guarantee civil rights and 
liberties in a broad sense. Thus they meet the historical demands o f 
bourgeoisie and they are subject to the law of development of modern 
bourgeois society ; in other words, they follow historical law (historische 
Gesetzmassigkeit). With the development of capitalism the proletariat 
comes to the front to make the situation complicated. The proletarians 
claim legality for themselves, while the bourgeois, with the growth of 
monopoly, try to abridge civil rights and liberties and render laws less 
meaningful and the legality principle of their own making less rigid. 
This is especially the case at the imperialist stage. In such a case this 
doctrine atually offers positive criticism, and its position is as. follows : 
the strict observance of legality in the true sense which is founded on 
;historical law, the stressing of the right of resistance to defend legality, 
or the advocating of a new legality principle through the recognition of 
historical law.") 
ii) Friedrich Engels, Einleitung (in: Die Klassenkampfe in Frankreich, von Marx, Dietz 
Verlag, 1951), 26.. Hermann Klenner, Formen and Bedeutung der Gesetzlichkeit in der 
Fuhrung des Klassenkampfes, 1953, 14f, 35, 51ff. Giinther R6sner, Das Widerstandsrecht 
des deutschen Volkes, Neue Justiz, 1955, Nr. 13, 403ff.
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   The foregoing idea is markedly in evidence in Marxian legal theory 
since the classic founders of Marxism, with Hermann Klenner among 
recent exponents. The theory partakes of legal positivism in that it 
values. legality. What is more interesting, it goes into the meaning 
of legality and laws in the historical and social setting that lends 
itself to emprirical recognition. It is more empirical and natural than 
the natural law doctrine which has the basis of criticizing positive 
law in metajurisitic natural law. It has also an interesting line of 
thought : legality-historical law (historische Gesetzmssigkeit)-the 
right of resistance. But the theory is not without some difficulties. 
Isn't it dangerous to derive the meaning of legality and laws from 
historical law directly and unconditionally? The reason is that in 
bourgeois society the variety of recogntion is insisted on, and that the 
same may be said emphatically of the recognition of historical law. 
There may be a correct recognition, to be sure, but to present historical 
law uncoditionally without definite qualifications in such society where 
the variety is insisted on will give rise to various ways of undeastanding 
legality. 
                       VI CONCLUSION 
   Now our consideration has come to an end. As stated at the onset, 
it was the purpose we had in mind to give a clue to understanding the 
most fundamental and real problems in jurisprudence. We may add a 
few words. We may stress the necessity of observing legality after all, 
but we must call special attention to civil rights and liberties or what 
are known as fundamental rights, which are what legality is really for. 
   Fundamental rights is a legal concept but. it has an historical 
character. It is a concept, and a legal concept, too, that has been 
forced in accordance with historical law that governs the development 
of society from the dissolution of the peasant classes to the growth of 
the modern bourgeoisie. From this standpoint the right of resistance 
may be justified as one of the fundamental rights or as a guarantee of 
liberties. As an example, we may cite the case of the Tokyo University 
Popolo Theater. 12) It is the opinion of the writer that this approach to
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the relations between legality and the right of resistance is one of the 
ways of solving the fundamental and real problems. 
12) The case of the Tokyo Unversity Popolo Theater referred to in the text arose when 
the ' Popolo Company', a group of student players authorized by Tokyo University, staged 
some dramas in a large classroom of the said university on February 20, 1952. The case 
has its origin in the entrance into the extempore theater by some plainclothes policemen, 
who, however, were caught by some of the students in the act of watching the behavior 
of those present. Thereupon the students, from motives of defending university autono-
my, surrounded and questioned the policemen, forcing them to surrender their official 
pocket-books. Against the apparent leader of the students prosecution was instituted on the 
principal charge of employing violence against the officers. But the accused was acquitted 
by the court of the first instance, which held that he was not guilty of a breach of 
criminal law in that he had acted in defence of university autonomy (May 11, 1954). 
On appeal the decision was sustained by the high court (May 8, 1956). The judicial 
opinion of the trial court in particular is worthy of special note in that it approves of 
means of `revolt and protest' being used for the purpose of defending university auto-
nomy or, more generally, academic freedom. " It would be to give up freedom to look 
on the unlawful action of officers with folded arms and fail to use all proper means 
available in revolt and protest against such action. Freedom will be violated unless we 
are constantly on our guard against all possible infringements " (The Hanrei Jiho, No. 
26, 1954; The italics are the writer's). Here in this case the public interest of academic 
freedom and the private interest of the officers' persons are balanced against each other 
after giving due justice to each of them, with the consequence that the former was 
adjudged somewhat preferable to the latter.
